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INEFFABLE INTUITION AND
UNREASONABLE SUSPICION: OUR RULE
OF LAW FAILURE
John Sexton*
Justin Sommerkamp**
Justin Martin***

I. INTRODUCTION

“T

HE wholesale harassment by certain sectors of the police
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes,
frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of
any evidence from any criminal trial.”1
It has become something of a meme to use the rule of law to mystify
the terms of legal and political discourse and to bludgeon opponents by
referencing our system’s most revered principles.2 We use it as a sling to
cast stones against human and civil rights abuses worldwide, yet we are
not equally vigilant about our failings at home.3 Some argue that we can,
in part, judge the quality of the rule of law in our nation by assessing the
amount of counter-majoritarian, rights-protective decisions that our
courts produce.4 Kairys notes that despite some hallowed Supreme Court
decisions, Brown for example, our courts are a barrier to the advancement of the rule of law as often as they are a vessel for its realization.5
One area in particular where our courts have been unduly disrespectful of
the rule of law is in the realm of searches, seizures, and reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.6
* Fifteenth President of New York University, Benjamin Butler Professor of Law
and NYU Law School’s Dean Emeritus, having served as Dean for fourteen years. He
joined the law school’s faculty in 1981, was named the school’s dean in 1988, and was
designated the university’s president in 2001.
** Justin Sommerkamp is AnBryce Scholar and J.D. Candidate, Class of 2015, New
York University School of Law.
*** Justin Martin is a J.D. Candidate, Class of 2015, at the New York University
School of Law.
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968).
2. David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307, 316
(2003) (discussing the rule of law as a shortcut for legitimizing an argument).
3. See id. at 325–27.
4. Id. at 323.
5. Id.; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. See Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up for Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision
in Terry v. Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 609 (2012).
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Our infinitely malleable standard of reasonable suspicion and the
seemingly illimitable discretion that it affords police, coupled with a lack
of police accountability and a degradation of the exclusionary rule, present serious domestic rule of law concerns.7 These concerns are more
than hypothetical and are more than spurious slippery slope arguments.8
Indeed, in this area of law, our nation already lies at the bottom of a
slippery slope. For example, the language of Terry (cited above and discussed in greater detail below) reassures us that the exclusionary rule
does nothing to ameliorate the harassment of minorities by the police.9
Be that as it may, the Warren Court Justices’ concerns about the future
application of Terry were remarkably prescient. History has indeed borne
out that granting police the ability to exercise tremendous amounts of
discretion under the pretext of reasonable suspicion has not just allowed
the harassment of minorities to continue—it has provided legal cover for
institutional programs of harassment.10
Between 2004 and 2012, the New York City Police Department
(NYPD) made 4.4 million stops under the program commonly known as
“stop and frisk.”11 Over 80% of those stopped were black or Hispanic.12
In response, black and Hispanic citizens of New York City brought suit
challenging both the constitutionality of their individual stops and the entire stop and frisk program under both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.13 In discussing the Fourth Amendment claim, Judge
Scheindlin noted both the difficulty of assessing the individual constitutionality of 4.4 million stops and the issue that the vast majority of factual
proof relied on by plaintiffs for these claims was the police reports created by officers following a stop.14 Scheindlin noted that even this imperfect source of information reveals that officers made at least 200,000 stops
without reasonable suspicion.15 In finding liability, Scheindlin wrote that,
at a minimum, the NYPD acted with deliberate indifference towards the
unconstitutional actions of its employees.16 And yet this was a modest
victory. As we will see below, the slow march towards the complete degradation of any meaningful standard of reasonable suspicion continues.
Floyd was not just a perfect storm of a malleable doctrine and a lack of
police accountability, and it is certainly not just a one-off. Rather, it is a
perfect manifestation of the tendencies and realistic possibilities in a system that has cast aside a meaningful, democratically-oriented rule of law.
7. See id. at 616.
8. See id. at 614.
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1968).
10. See Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J.
423, 486, 489, 493 (2004).
11. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 557.
14. Id. at 559.
15. Id. She does not doubt that more than 200,000 stops were conducted without reasonable suspicion, but due to the NYPD’s faulty recording keeping, we will never know. Id.
16. Id. at 561.
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How did we get here, and where do we go? In the following sections,
this essay lays out the development of the reasonable suspicion standard
under the Fourth Amendment and argues that it is fundamentally incompatible with a meaningful, democratically-oriented rule of law. Finally, we
offer a brief conclusion with suggestions of how to restore the rule of law
in this area.
II. SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND REASONABLE SUSPICION
“Whether you stand still, move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit,
you may be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish
to stop or arrest you. Such subject, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable
intuition should not be credited.”17
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”18 The rights it provides “belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms,”19 and in order to protect
those rights, “every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”20
Despite its supposedly revered status, the Fourth Amendment’s ability
to protect our rights continues to be incrementally weakened at every
turn through a multitude of special circumstances.21 At the heart of the
discussion (and the problem) surrounding the protections provided by the
Fourth Amendment are two societal values in diametric opposition: law
enforcement’s need for flexible powers and responses to the myriad situations that arise when investigating criminal activity and the hallowed right
of citizens to be free from arbitrary governmental intrusion into their
lives.22 Writing for the majority in one of the most contentious opinions
in the Court’s twentieth century history, Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion in Terry v. Ohio came down on the side of law enforcement needs and
forever changed the nature of interactions between citizens and police
officers.23
The Terry opinion itself was not a broad acceptance of police authority
to accost citizens at will, but it certainly became the seed of the poisonous
tree. In the years since Terry, jurisprudence on the issue has consisted of
a one-way march of police power expansion that has increasingly deviated from the language in the Terry opinion and has weakened our nation’s rule of law.24
17. United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Burton, J., dissenting)).
20. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21. See Katz, supra note 10, at 461–62.
22. See id. at 429.
23. See id. at 443, 447–49.
24. See id. at 487.
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A. THE TERRY STANDARD
Prior to 1968, officers effectuating a search or seizure were required to
have probable cause to support a belief that the suspect in question was
engaged in criminal activity.25 For Fourth Amendment purposes, constitutionally valid police-citizen interactions occurred only when pursuant to
voluntary citizen cooperation or when supported by probable cause.26
Terry identified a third type of police-citizen interaction—an “investigative stop” or “Terry stop”—that is neither based on voluntary citizen interaction, nor supported by probable cause.27 The more limited Terry
stops, the Court reasoned, are governed by the Fourth Amendment’s
general requirement of reasonableness rather than the Warrant Clause.28
To lawfully detain a person for a brief investigative stop, an officer need
only have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity
may be afoot.29 An officer justified in conducting a Terry stop may also
subject the person stopped to a pat-down in search of weapons if the
officer reasonably suspects the person is “armed and presently
dangerous.”30
The facts of Terry are critical to understanding how and why the Court
developed the reasonable suspicion standard. On October 31, 1963,
Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden, a 39-year veteran of the
police force, was patrolling downtown Cleveland in plain clothes.31 McFadden witnessed Terry and another man, Chilton, repeatedly walking up
and down a block and decided to watch them further.32 The men would
confer on one end of the block before one would leave, pause in front of
a store window, peer inside, and then proceed to the end of the block.33
The other man would undertake the same process, and the two would
again link up on the corner.34 At one point, the two spoke briefly to a
third man, Katz, before continuing their routine.35 Officer McFadden observed this behavior over the course of ten to twelve minutes, at which
point Terry and Chilton walked off in the direction that Katz had gone.36
The activities of Terry and Chilton aroused the suspicion of Officer McFadden, who believed the men were performing reconnaissance for an
armed robbery.37 He followed them a short distance before approaching
25. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 26–27 (1968). In reality, this was the standard
only in theory, and police use of warrantless searches and seizures occurred regularly, particularly in minority communities. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183–84 (1967).
26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 19–20.
29. Id. at 30–31.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 5–6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the group, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their
names.38 When the men mumbled something in response, Officer McFadden, fearful that the men might be armed, grabbed Terry, spun him
around, and patted down the outside of his clothing, where he found a
pistol in Terry’s left breast pocket.39 Officer McFadden proceeded to perform the same pat-down to the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz, yielding an additional pistol from the pocket of Chilton’s overcoat.40 Notably,
Officer McFadden testified that he only patted the trio down to determine whether they had weapons and never reached inside their outer
clothing until he felt the firearms.41 Terry and Chilton were subsequently
arrested, charged with carrying concealed weapons, and convicted at
trial.42
The Court affirmed the conviction but recognized that for Fourth
Amendment purposes, a person detained by an officer for an investigative stop is undoubtedly “seized,” and any subsequent frisk is a
“search.”43 An investigative stop is justified only by an objective reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is engaging in or is about to engage
in criminal activity and must be limited in scope to the circumstances
which justified the initial stop.44 A “seizure” occurs whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and prevents him from walking away.45 The
officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts,” available
at the time of the seizure, which, taken together with rational inferences,
would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action
taken was appropriate.”46
A frisk pursuant to a valid stop is justified only if the officer reasonably
believes the person to be armed and presently dangerous.47 The Court
recognized the substantial privacy intrusions inherent in the procedure
and placed strict restrictions on the situations that qualify its use.48 An
investigatory stop is often “performed in public by a policeman while the
citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised,” and it
represents a “serious intrusion upon the person, which may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment.”49 The frisk is performed solely
to allow the officer to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon
that might threaten his safety.50
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 6–7.
at 7.

at
at
at
at

16.
29–31.
16.
21–22.

at 16–17.
at 17.
at 24.
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Applying these standards, the Terry Court found that Officer McFadden was pursuing the general interest of crime prevention and detection
when he approached Terry, Chilton, and Katz, and his suspicions were
reasonable based on the men’s activities.51 The Court specifically noted
that although their sidewalk activities viewed independently and out of
context may not seem suspicious, viewing the activities together left little
doubt that Officer McFadden’s suspicion was reasonable.52
The Court looked more searchingly upon Officer McFadden’s decision
to search Terry. In addition to the governmental interest in investigating
crime, the Court also noted that the immediate safety of the officer and
his need to assure himself that Terry was not armed with a weapon that
could be used against him was a strong interest.53 Officer McFadden was
justified in suspecting Terry of plotting an armed robbery, which would
presumably involve a weapon, and nothing about their interaction had
given him reason to change his hypothesis.54 Thus, Officer McFadden’s
belief that the men were armed was justified.55
A protective frisk conducted during a legitimate investigative stop must
not only be justified at its inception, but it must also be reasonably related to the justification for its initiation in scope.56 It must be confined in
scope to an instruction reasonably designed to discover the type of weapons that could be hidden on the person and used to assault the officer.57
Officer McFadden’s search of the men clearly fell within these limits.58
His pat-down was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine
whether the men were armed and was limited only to the outer clothing.59 McFadden’s only intrusion into pockets or inside surfaces of their
clothes occurred after he had discovered the weapons on Terry and
Chilton and, even then, was limited to an immediate retrieval.60
B. SEARCH

AND

SEIZURE

AFTER

TERRY

On its face, the Terry decision seemed to strike a relatively reasonable
balance between the competing interests of the needs of law enforcement
and the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusion. Perhaps it did, but even several members of the Terry Court could
see the potential for abuse from the doctrine’s inception.61 Justice Harlan
noted in his concurrence that any right to frisk is dependent upon the
reasonableness of the forcible stop to investigate a crime since, ordinarily,
51. Id. at 23.
52. Id. at 22–23.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 28.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 28–29.
57. Id. at 29.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 29–30.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 33–34 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White, J., concurring); id. at 36,
38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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all persons addressed have a right “to ignore their interrogator and walk
away.”62 Justice White’s concurrence makes it clear that officers are without restriction to approach persons and engage them with questions, but
that person is equally free to refuse cooperation and go on his way.63
Further, even when an officer may properly briefly detain persons against
their will for questioning, “the person stopped is not obliged to answer,
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis
for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation.”64 Justice Douglas’s dissent highlights the danger associated
with affording police the power to search in circumstances where a detached magistrate could not similarly issue a warrant, and it cautions
against the “powerful hydraulic pressures . . . that bear heavily on the
Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the
upper hand.”65 Even Justice Brennan, whose insistence had convinced
the Chief Justice to condition investigative stops on reasonable suspicion,
expressed his discomfort with the opinion.66 In a private letter to the
Chief Justice, Brennan explained that he was “truly worried” over the
“risk that police will conjure up ‘suspicious circumstances’ and courts will
credit their versions.”67
The justices’ concerns expressed over the Terry doctrine have largely
come to fruition over the last fifty years. The Terry standard has been
expanded, manipulated, and used to justify police actions that clearly do
not fall within the parameters of the doctrine as it was originally envisioned; underlying Fourth Amendment rights have slowly lost their judicial protection.68
In particular, Terry did little to assist lower courts in determining the
types of facts that could meet the reasonable suspicion standard.69 An
early attempt to further define the standard led only to the holding that
any inquiry should look at the “totality of the particular circumstances”
to determine whether a particularized reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity was present.70 By 1989, the Terry standard was held to require
only “some minimal level of objective justification” for making the stop.71
62. Id. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 37–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66. See Debra Livingston, Police Patrol, Judicial Integrity, and the Limits of Judicial
Control, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1353, 1357 (1998).
67. Id.
68. See McAffee, supra note 6, at 614, 616.
69. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme
Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
975, 982 (1998).
70. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 n.10 (1975); United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“Terms like ‘articulable reasons’ and ‘founded suspicion’
are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad
factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality
of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.”).
71. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (rejecting an attempt by the Ninth
Circuit to create a test by which to assess the reasonable suspicion standard).
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With this softened standard, it is of little wonder that just about anything can become a valid, articulable fact in support a reasonable suspicion of criminality. Examples of these “valid” and “objective” facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion of criminality: avoiding eye contact,72
too much eye contact,73 being nervous,74 being calm,75 walking away,76
running away,77 waving at police,78 not waving at police,79 and a host of
other innocuous activities, a complete list of which could surely fill out
the remainder of this brief essay. In a recent opinion, the Tenth Circuit
astonishingly upheld a stop where the officer testified that the suspect’s
acne and placement of hands on the steering wheel at the “10 and 2”
positions were factors in his suspicion.80 One early post-Terry court may
have reasoned correctly when it held that mere presence in a “high-crime
area” alone could not satisfy the standard,81 but the reality of police-citizen interactions in such areas hardly reflects the Court’s ruling.82 It has
simply become standard to tack on additional, equally ambiguous factors
to justify the stop, and police officers have not had difficulty finding approval from the judiciary.83
Anything more than an outright admission by an officer to relying
solely on a subjective hunch, it would seem, can be an articulable fact that
gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.84 Of course, in
practice, such admissions are few and far between.85 Experienced officers
who do in fact act upon nothing more than an inchoate hunch will simply
cage their testimony using tried and true “objective” reasons for conducting the stop.86 Because of the deference the Court has said must be
afforded to officer testimony in any Terry stop case, lower courts are eager to grasp onto an officer’s version of the facts as the starting point for
72. See, e.g., United States v. Nikzad, 739 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984); Williams v.
State, 754 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. App. 2001).
73. See, e.g., 739 F.2d at 1433; State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1980).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179, 182–83 (5th Cir. 1988).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 955 F.2d 976, 979 (1992); United States v.
Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1380–82 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d
991, 992–93 (1977).
76. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); Wilson v. United States, 802
A.2d 367 (D.C. 2002).
77. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002).
79. See, e.g., id. at 271.
80. United States v. Westhoven, 562 F. App’x 726, 727–28 (10th Cir. 2014).
81. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
82. Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 100
(1999).
83. See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 33 (1994).
84. Id.
85. See Patrick S. Yatchak, Breaching the Peace: The Trivialization of the Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness Standard in the Wake of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 25
HAMLINE L. REV. 329, 354–55 (2002).
86. See Craig S. Lerner, Judges Policing Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 25–33
(2007).
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their fact-finding analysis.87 Officers testify using rote terms like “suspicious bulge” and “furtive movement,” which have previously been accepted by courts, making it a simple matter for the judge in question to
approve of the stop based on precedent.88
As if the expanded Terry standard were not dangerous enough as applied to pedestrians, the Court’s application of the standard to traffic
stops essentially converted the investigatory stop into an “open sesame
for general searches”89 any time a person leaves their home. It was not
long before the Court would empower police officers with the ability to
order drivers from their vehicles absent suspicion of any crime beyond a
traffic violation, calling the trampling of liberty a “petty indignity.”90 The
ability to order passengers from a vehicle would follow despite the fact
that persons riding in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop were not suspected
of any type of wrongdoing.91 Further expansions would provide police
with the authority to “frisk” a vehicle92 and subject a vehicle to a suspicionless search via a drug sniffing dog.93 Perhaps the most startling decision relating to traffic stops occurred in Whren v. United States, where the
Court held that the subjective motivations of officers making a stop are
irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes, essentially opening the door
for selective legal enforcement.94 So long as the officer is justified in conducting the initial stop based on reasonable suspicion that the suspect has
violated even a single minor violation, the officer’s subjective intent plays
no part in the analysis.95 Without the protections of the Fourth Amendment, persons subject to racially disparate enforcement through the Terry
doctrine are forced to seek remedy under the Equal Protection Clause.96
The effect of Whren is to deprive the defendants of the ability of to suppress the evidence gained against them through unconstitutional means.97
Given the prevalence of incredibly robust traffic codes in our nation, the
Whren opinion in essence signed off on exactly the type of general warrants that the Fourth Amendment was designed to combat.98
Despite this immense power granted to police through the expanded
Terry doctrine, a counter-balancing mechanism does exist. Since the earlier Warren Court opinion of Mapp v. Ohio provided the now-familiar
87. Harris, supra note 83, at 32–37 (arguing that “police justify questionable searches
and seizures with creative hindsight or even perjury”).
88. Id.
89. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 415 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)).
91. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997).
92. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1983).
93. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (upholding use of drug dog sniff of vehicle performed
during traffic stop despite the fact that officer had suspicion only of traffic offense).
94. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
95. Id.
96. Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1064 (2010).
97. Id.
98. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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exclusionary rule, evidence obtained by the government from a search or
seizure in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is suppressed.99 The exclusionary rule has often been criticized as excessive and
costly to society, and jurists dislike its use because the immediate effect of
its invocation is often that a guilty defendant will walk free.100 It may be
an imperfect rule, but in light of the expanded Terry doctrine, its viability
has never been more important.101 In addition to the usual judicial reluctance against its operation, two recent Supreme Court decisions have further hampered the exclusionary rule’s ability to provide meaningful
protection of Fourth Amendment rights. Hudson v. Michigan extensively
discussed the exclusionary rule as an obsolete relic that imposes large
costs on society and deserves to be jettisoned.102 Though that section of
Scalia’s opinion was only able to garner four votes,103 a 2009 case later
drew heavily from Hudson. In that case, Herring, the Court took another
step towards abolishing the exclusionary rule, describing it as a disfavored
“last resort”.104 The Court held that the rule should only apply when the
police conduct is sufficiently deliberate and culpable, such that the exclusion would provide deterrence “worth the price paid by the justice
system.”105
There is little doubt that Justice Scalia’s scathing criticism in Hudson
helped pave the way for disarming the exclusionary rule in Herring.106
Amazingly, Hudson cites “increasing professionalism of police forces”
and “evidence that police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously.”107 Surely, our nation’s founding fathers would agree that constitutional protections really are not necessary
as long as the judiciary feels it is proper to “‘assume’ that all unlawful
police behavior would be ‘dealt with appropriately’ by the authorities.”108
Over a decade of conduct by the NYPD before Floyd sheds light on the
professionalism of police forces and the serious consideration they give to
the rights of citizens. Under stop and frisk, a great deal of the 4.4 million
searches conducted by the police are immune to findings of whether suspicion was reasonable or not because officers were not attentive to the
required paperwork.109 Officers were told to target “the right people.”110
99. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
100. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (upholding the exclusionary rule
only because Justice Kennedy, one of the five-vote majority, refused to join that section of
the opinion.).
101. See Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fenton, “A More Majestic Conception”: The
Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
47, 47 (2010).
102. 547 U.S. at 591.
103. Id. at 603, 604.
104. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
105. Id. at 144.
106. Harris, supra note 72, at 32–37.
107. 547 U.S. at 598–99.
108. Id.
109. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
110. Id. at 603.
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Interviews with officers and administrators are particularly illuminating.111 Police Chief Esposito admitted to targeting young men of color in
their late teens or early twenties.112 Officer McCormack, when asked
which groups were committing robberies, had no problem singling out
young African-American males.113 The NYPD was aware as early as 1999
that the stop and frisk program disproportionately impacted minority citizens.114 Supervisors regularly voiced blatant contempt for local
populations.115
This lack of internal record keeping, racial bias, and blatant contempt
for citizens of the city the police force is sworn to protect and serve led to
an institutionalization of a racist program by which African-Americans
and Hispanics were stopped at disproportionately higher rates116and
were more likely to be subject to the use of force.117 Officers interviewed
indicated that those challenging the use of racial indicators were ignoring
reasonable suspicion,118 while Scheindlin terms the program one of “racebased suspicion.”119 NYPD officers’ poor training as to what constitutes
“furtive movements,” a behavior justifying a stop, was so prevalent that it
could be interpreted to mean nearly anything.120 In the absence of concrete meaning, and perhaps on an unconscious level, being a minority
became a furtive movement.
III. THE RULE OF LAW
“The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not ‘readily
or even usefully reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’”121
Perhaps it is a cheap shot to use this language from Sokolow to make a
glib point that our standard of reasonable suspicion is a somewhat inimical concept to the rule of law. But what, exactly, is the rule of law? It is
surely an amorphous concept used to support political agendas as often as
used to honestly assess the quality of governance. The rule of law has
been defined in terms of procedure and in substance.122 Kairys described
numerous characteristics associated with defining the rule of law:
First, certain relationships . . . should be governed by rules. This is
perhaps the most elementary aspect of the rule of law . . . Second,
111. Chief Esposito, according to Scheindlin, is “the highest ranking uniformed member of the NYPD throughout the class period.” Id. Serrano was an officer during the class
period. Id.
112. Id. at 604.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 590–91.
115. Id. at 597.
116. Id. at 562.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 603.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 561.
121. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing the Supreme Court’s decision
in Gates to apply that court’s language on probable cause to reasonable suspicion); see also
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
122. Kairys, supra note 2, at 308.
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the rules should be accessible and available to everyone, so that everyone might know the rules upon which a society operates. Third, the
rules should be applicable to everyone . . . Fourth, follow the rules
laid down . . . Fifth, the legal process should be fair.123
Kairys then notes a total of fourteen oft-mentioned characteristics of
the rule of law, everything from considerations of justice to judicial review.124 Finally, he notes that the rule of law is often discussed as a social
or political system “in grandiose terms,” rather than as an element of
democracy.125 In this way, Kairys argues the “rule of law,” rather than
democracy, is often offered as the highest ordering principle of our system.126 He argues further that at present the rule of law is often used to
politically delegitimize arguments on both sides of the spectrum.127
Kairys himself endorses what he terms as a “minimalist” formulation of
the rule of law.128
In this minimalist sense (which is not without its own definitional and
boundary problems), there are three essential requirements for the
rule of law: certain relationships, events and transactions should be
subject to rules; the rules laid down should be followed and should
apply to everyone, including limits on government and on the powerful; and the rules should be enforced with some mechanism for seeking redress.129
Accepting Kairys’s minimalist definition of the rule of law, his intuition
that it flows from a democratic system rather than the other way around,
and his argument that it requires the protection of a democratically-oriented judiciary,130 any number of the circumstances mentioned previously as supporting an objective finding of reasonable suspicion, not to
mention a decade of racially discriminatory stops-and-frisks, are clear
failures of the rule of law. When the judiciary is a cavernous maw ready
to accept any suspicion as reasonable and give any manner of deference
to law enforcement, it is clear that police stops are not governed by rules
in any meaningful sense.
Obviously, the rule of law cannot just mean that clear rules must always prevail over mushy standards. Without naming them, it is sufficient
to say that there are various aspects of our own constitutional law in
which governance by standards is at least arguably preferable. However,
123. Id. at 312.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 314.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 315–17.
128. Kairys’s main concern with the rule of law is that it is used as a blunt instrument to
label countries, cultures, and religions as uncivilized and outside the community of nations.
He is concerned about its imperialistic and grandiose overtones, and sees democracy, engagement, and democratically-oriented judges as necessary to the operation of rule of law.
Id. at 326–29.
129. Id. at 318.
130. “Democratically-oriented” does not mean aligned with the Democratic Party. It
means a judiciary that is predisposed to protect and advance the rights of ordinary citizens.
Id. at 327.
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in a democratic society, as strict of rules as practicable should govern the
interaction between individuals and the inherently coercive arm of the
state. Individuals should be able to conform their conduct to some type of
rule to avoid reasonable suspicion, even if they are guilty. Drawing on
Posner’s point in Bloomfield, is there any question that being able to be
found “reasonably suspicious” due to an officer’s inchoate intuition
whenever or wherever is compatible with a robust rule of law?131 Is there
any question that an honest measure of accountability and healthy respect for the citizens of New York would have avoided the racially discriminatory program at issue in Floyd?132 The rule of law failure is
systemic. This must be acknowledged if we are to reintroduce the rule of
law into the reasonable suspicion standard.
IV. CONCLUSION
“The goals of liberty and safety may be in tension, but they can coexist—
indeed, the Constitution mandates it.”133
As we have noted, Kairys points out that modern proponents of the
rule of law see it as the grand ordering principle of our system and that it
requires democracy in order to function.134 He counters this view with
one in which democracy is the grand ordering principle of our system
because it is innately desirable.135 Kairys intuits that the rule of law does
not “self-execute,”136 but rather it relies on individuals within the judiciary and throughout society. How are we to square this view of the rule of
law as necessary to providing the reliable legal system required by democracy with the reality of our system that leads to decisions in cases like
Westhoven,137 Brown v. Texas,138 Wardlow,139 and the institutionalization
of a racist program of policing in New York City?
Perhaps the problem with our reasonable suspicion doctrine is not necessarily with the form it has taken, but rather that it has been shaped by a
judiciary that is not diligent enough in protecting civil rights and executed
by police forces that are not accountable. Kairys writes of the failure of
our rule of law in the context of our treatment of “unlawful combatants.”140 He calls our rule of law hypocritical and not protective enough
of human rights.141 All of this may be true, but even if it were not, the
degradation of the Fourth Amendment in the ways we have described is a
131. United States v. Brownfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005).
132. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
133. Id. at 556.
134. Kairys, supra note 2, at 314.
135. “We need democracy because we need democracy, and we need freedom and
equality because we need freedom and equality.” Id. at 314.
136. Id. at 327.
137. See United States v. Westhoven, 562 Fed. App’x 726, 730 (10th Cir. 2014) (not
selected for publication).
138. See 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979).
139. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000).
140. Kairys, supra note 2, at 326.
141. Id.
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more subtle and pervasive deterioration of the rule of law within the
United States.
Obviously, results like Westhoven create concern for arbitrary applications of discretion by frontline law enforcement.142 But we do not need to
carry out a hypothetical thought experiment to draw this conclusion. Despite the Supreme Court’s skepticism in Terry that the exclusion of evidence would help end harassment of minorities by police,143 history
under the broad and inclusive standard of reasonable suspicion has borne
out otherwise. We have already discussed Floyd, yet our criminal justice
system is filled with racial disparities too numerous to mention in great
detail here.144 For example, while African-Americans make up only 13%
of the population, they constitute 28% of all arrests, 40% of the incarcerated population, and 42% of the population on death row.145 Minorities
remain over-represented in overall arrest rates and are more likely to be
sentenced to prison, where they face longer sentences than whites.146 A
2013 report created by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) indicates that “extreme” racial disparities exist in marijuana possession arrests.147 Indeed, African-Americans are 3.73 times more likely to be
arrested for marijuana possession than whites.148
Of course, a reasonable suspicion jurisprudence that situates a great
deal of discretion in frontline law enforcement is not alone responsible
for these racial disparities.149 But is there any question that it contributes
to them, or at least has the capacity to? Whatever the view of the Supreme Court when Terry was written, it is clear that the malleability of
the reasonable suspicion standard has at least contributed to racial disparities within our criminal justice system.150 It is plausible that what
Kairys describes as unconscious racism contributes at the level of “reasonable” suspicion.151
But what is the solution? How can we still allow for effective law enforcement while better implementing the rule of law in this area of our
system? We need a solution that lays out predictable rules as to what
constitutes reasonable suspicion such that individuals can preemptively
conform their conduct, and one that does not lend itself to the perpetua142. Westhoven, 562 Fed. App’x at 730.
143. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968) (“The wholesale harassment by certain
elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal
trial.”).
144. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
145. NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, CREATED EQUAL: RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE US CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (Christopher Hartney &
Linh Vuong eds., 2009).
146. Id. at 3.
147. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 17
(2013).
148. Id.
149. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 588–89.
150. See id.
151. See David Kairys, Unconscious Racism, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 857 (2011).
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tion of racial disparities. We need stronger governance of frontline police
conduct.
Scheindlin’s suggested remedies are admirable.152 In her opinion on
remedies in Floyd, she appointed a monitor to oversee internal NYPD
reforms, ordered the NYPD to revise its internal practices in accordance
with her liability opinion, ordered improved record keeping, and even
ordered a pilot program for the use of body cameras on police officers.153
This idea of using police body cameras could be gaining traction. In
fact, in a 2013 position paper, the ACLU suggested that such “bodycams” could be used as a method to provide documentary evidence of
encounters between the police and the public and noted that such programs could be mutually beneficial.154 In order to ensure that the cameras do not become a tool for the government to monitor the public,
instead of the other way around, the ACLU makes suggestions that include limiting the ability of the police to edit footage “on the fly,” limiting
footage retention, limiting the use of recordings, and establishing good
technological controls.155
While not a doctrinal solution, officer body-cams offer a workaround
that can have positive rule of law implications. Certainly, the body-cams
would remove the analysis of whether suspicion is reasonable away from
a secondhand account and help truly objectivize the standard. One can
imagine this footage being played in the courtroom, providing a more
objective view as to whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable and
based on articulable fact.
Perhaps we need a broader move away from order-maintenance policing. Making changes in this area appears to be an intractable problem.156
Beyond the rule of law, order-maintenance policing that institutes stop
and frisk programs has numerous hidden costs.157 These costs include the
collateral consequences imposed on those stopped for even minor offenses,158 great costs on the community,159 the burden on procedural jus152. She appointed a monitor to oversee the internal NYPD reform process, ordered
the NYPD to revise their internal practices in accordance with her findings of liability,
ordered the NYPD to improve its record-keeping, and even ordered a pilot program of the
use of body cameras. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
153. The City naturally appealed her orders of August 2013, and the Second Circuit
issued a stay of the injunction pending the appeal. Following the election of Bill de Blasio
in late January 2014, the City moved for a limited remand to the district court, where the
parties are seeking a resolution. Id. at 685.
154. JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS:
WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL 1 (2013). Stanley argues that body-cams
could simultaneously protect against police misconduct while protecting the police from
false allegations of abuse.
155. Id. at 2–6.
156. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 325 (2009).
157. See id.
158. They include immigration, public housing, incarceration, driving, and employment
consequences. See id. at 300-06.
159. Namely, the impacts on families. Id. at 306.
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tice,160 and most importantly, substantive justice.161
We could also restrict the reasonable suspicion standard by requiring a
higher showing for a lesser offense. Some have already made similar suggestions,162 and two state supreme courts have distinguished non-criminal
from criminal activity for the purpose of stop and frisks by restricting the
use of stop and frisks for non-criminal purposes.163 Keenan and Thomas
suggest that a court reviewing a pedestrian stop would begin by identifying the suspected offense and if the offense is civil or noncriminal in determining whether to make a stop.164 Their model would rely in part on
legislatures, realizing Kairys’s idea that a robust rule of law requires democratic engagement.165 Legislatures could characterize offenses and dictate when stops are reasonable. However, much like a move away from
order-maintenance policing, it does not appear that legislative, political
incentives are well suited to making this type of change. The idea remains
admirable nonetheless.
To conclude, we return to Kairys’ point: the rule of law is not selfexecuting.166 Established and well-known institutions, procedures, and
processes do not ensure the presence of justice.167 One can easily imagine
a system where arbitrary factors inform reasonable suspicion on an unconscious level because that is the system we have. Instead, we must,
hopefully not naively, rely on our judiciary and the public to execute the
rule of law, and thereby protect everyone from the arbitrary policing that,
mixed with the malleable reasonable suspicion doctrine, presents concerns. This is not entirely utopian: the recent Supreme Court decision in
Riley was certainly a step in the right direction.168 Body cameras and similar workarounds could hold promise and are within legislative competency. The degradation of the reasonable suspicion doctrine indicates that
the rule of law is not just something that can be installed and left to operate—we must all shepherd its development and never forget to tend to
our own system.

160. Id. at 308.
161. Id. at 313 (“As the system works now, the innocent do not have the chance to
obtain public vindication, and the guilty can often evade trial and conviction.”).
162. David Keenan and Tina M. Thomas, An Offense-Severity Model for Stop-andFrisks, 123 YALE L.J. 1448 (2014).
163. Id. at 1477–79.
164. Id. at 1468.
165. Id. at 1484–85.
166. Kairys, supra note 2, at 327.
167. Id. at 312–13.
168. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (holding that law enforcement
officers cannot search the private contents of a cell phone incident to an arrest without a
warrant).

